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"POUR-OVER" PROVISIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA
In recent years, the validity of the "pour-over" provision in a will has
become the subject of vexatious controversy and conflicting judicial opinion.'
There are many variations to the problem but fundamentally it arises when
a man executes a will in which it is provided that his estate, or a part of it,
shall be distributed to an inter vivos trust created by the testator or another,
either contemporaneously with, or prior to the execution of the will. The dif-
ficulty is encountered when the trust is amendable or revocable or both; and
the controversy is highlighted, when the testator thereafter amends the trust
but leaves the will untouched.
In order to explore the legal justification and background of such testa-
mentary dispositions, it is necessary to examine two separate theories. The
first is the doctrine of "incorporation by reference" whereby the reference in
a will to a trust has the effect of making the terms of the trust a part and
parcel of the will, notwithstanding the fact that the trust instrument does not
meet the statutory requirements for the execution of wills.'
This is perhaps a convenient method of explanation when the pour-over
is to an irrevocable trust in existence at the time the will is executed,; however,
beyond that, this theory has only served as the source of a large portion of the
confusion surrounding this area of the law of wills.' For example, there is
considerable disagreement among the proponents of this doctrine as to the
validity of the pour-over when the trust instrument permits the trust to be re-
voked or altered. The salient objection here is that a testator should not be
permitted to reserve to himself the power to change the testamentary devolu-
tion of his property by an instrument or means not in compliance with the
wills act. 4 This objection has been met by an equal number of authorities who
contend that a mere unexercised power should not be sufficient to prevent the
operation of the incorporation by reference, particularly when the effect is to
' See Lauritzen, Pour-Over Wills-Cautions in Light of Recent Statutes and Decisions, 95
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 992 (1956); Palmer, Testamentary Dispositions to the Trustee of an Inter-
vivos Trust, 50 MICm. L. REv. 33 (1950); Lauritzen, Can a Revocable Trust be Incorporated by
Reference?, 45 ILL. L. REv. 583 (1950); Shattuck, Pour-Over Trust-A Renewed Warning to
Draftsmen, 91 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 207 (1952); 28 PA. BAR ASs'N. Q. 343; PA. FIDUCIARY
REVIEW, March 1957.
2 This doctrine has long been recognized and accepted by Pennsylvania Courts. For a collection
of cases on the subject see the PA, FIDUCIARY REVIEW, October 1946 and December, 1952.
3 Compare Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (1st Cir. 1921), cert.
denied, with Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 N.E. 419 (1934). See also
Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills, 43 HARV. L. REv. 521 (1930); Palmer, supra note 1, at 37.
4 Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., supra note 3; Boal v. Metropolitan Museum of
Art. 298 Fed. 894 (2nd Cir. 1924); Matter of Jones, [1942] 1 Ch. 328, [1942] 1 All E.R. 642.
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thwart the clear intent of the testator.5 However, when this power to revoke
or amend is in fact exercised, the courts and writers adhering to this doctrine
are almost unanimous in declaring that since the reference must be to the
trust as it existed at the time of the execution of the will, the bequest must
either fail completely or pass according to the original terms of the trust."
Regardless of the alternative chosen, the net effect is to defeat the obvious
intent of the testator.
The second theory upon which the courts and writers have proceeded in
determining the validity of a pour-over provision is the doctrine of "independ-
ent legal significance." ' In order to give meaning to the terms of the will, the
courts resort to extrinsic facts which have significance apart from their effect
upon the testamentary disposition. The trust is regarded as a separate entity.
The identity of the beneficiaries, their respective shares, the trustee, the trust
property and the purpose of the trust may all be ascertained by reference to
the terms of the independently significant trust mentioned in the will. 8
The adoption of this doctrine enables a court to look to the trust as it
existed at the time of death. Thus, the pour-over provision serves as a flexible
and convenient means of property distribution upon death, and not a mere
trap for the unaware which may lead to the frustration of the testator's intent.
As was pointed out 'by Professor Scott:
"If the testamentary trust can be upheld upon the ground that the terms
of the testamentary trust are determined by facts of independent significance,
and the inter vivos trust as it exists from time to time is such a fact, there would
seem to be no objection to permitting the property passing by the will to be
added to the inter vivos trust in accordance with the terms of that trust as they
are at the death of the testator, even though they were modified after the execu-
tion of the will." 9
5 Montgomery v. Blakenship, 217 Ark. 357, 230 S.W. 2d 51 (1950); Swetland v. Swetland,
102 N. J. Eq. 294, 140 Ad. 279 (1928); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio 195, 58 N.E. 2d
381 (1944). Pennsylvania is clearly in accord with this line of cases. Wilson's Estate, 363 Pa. 546,
70 A.2d 354 (1950). It appears that this view represents the weight of authority in the United
States. 1 Scott, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 543, at 297 (1939).
6 President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 232
(1940) (the entire bequest was invalidated); Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 490,
197 N.E. 419 (1934) (Bequest invalidated). Generally the courts have favored the latter alternative,
and have allowed the property to pass in accordance with the terms of the original trust. Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380; 196 N.E. 920 (1935); Fifth-Third Union Trust Co. v.
Wilensky, 79 Ohio App. 73, 70 N.E. 2d 920 (1946).
7 See Evans, Nontestamentary Acts and Incorporation by Reference, 16 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 635
(1949); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 54 (1935). See also the articles in note 1, supra, and the cases
collected therein.
8 Professors Scott and Bogert strongly advocate the adoption of this theory. Scott, LAw OF
TRUSTS, § 53 (1939); Bogert, LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 106 (1935).
9 Scott, op. cit. supra note 8 at 299.
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The inevitable, but not insuperable, objection to this view is raised by
the proponents of a strict adherence to the traditional rules governing the
creation of testamentary trusts. They contend that:
S*... no multiplication words or refinements can alter the results above stated
that [the testator] had by this plan sought prospectively to create for himself
the power to dispose of property vested in him at the time of 'his death by
instruments not executed in accordance with the Statute of Wills." 10
Upon closer analysis, it can be at least questioned whether these two views
are as inconsistent as they appear at first blush. Certainly courts talk of ascer-
taining the meaning of a will from within its "four corners"; but it is equally
certain that language in the will must be related to extrinsic facts. It will be
conceded that a bequest to "my wife," or to "such persons who may be in my
employ at death," is a perfectly valid testamentary disposition even though the
eyes of the court may stray from the traditionally sacred "four corners." More-
over, in the latter example the mere fact that the testator "hires and fires"
after the execution of the will does not in any way alter the validity of the
bequest. A bequest to X charity is unquestioned notwithstanding the fact that
the ultimate use to which the gift is made stems from the charter of the char-
ity and not from a recital in the will.
However a judicial step away from the historically embedded formalities
of a will is one not quickly taken. In many instances, it is a step that the
courts will refuse to take at all unless it is with the statutory consent of the
legislature.
The foregoing brief analysis of the common law gives little comfort,
however, to the lawyer engaged in formulating an estate plan free from "thin
ice." At the moment he is not at all interested in winning litigation; but
rather, his primary interest is avoiding it, and at the same time satisfying the
needs and desires of his client. Nevertheless, it does serve to illuminate the
need for legislation on the subject. As was most aptly pointed out by one
noted author on trusts and estates, the lawyer who undertakes to make use of
a pour-over provision in an estate plan is ". . . plunging into the treacherous
currents of this not yet fully charter section of the sea of wills." "
The 1957 session of the Pennsylvania Legislature, prompted by both
bench and bar, took up the challenge of this confusing dilemma, and has, in
10 Atwood v. Rhode Island Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513, 523 (1st Cir. 1921); In re Doane's
Estate, 190 Cal. 412, 213 Pac. 53 (1923); Lawless v. Lawless, 187 Va. 511, 47 S.E. 2d 421 (1948).
See also the Articles by Lauritzen, supra note 1.
11 Lauritzen, Pour-Over Wills, 95 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 992 (1956).
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this writer's opinion, successfully navigated and charted this area of doubt.
A new section of the Wills Act of 1947 provides as follows: 12
SECTION 14.1. Devise or Bequest to Trust. A devise or bequest in a will
may be made to the trustee of a trust (including an unfunded life insurance
trust although the settlor has reserved any or all rights of ownership in the
insurance contracts) established in writing by the testator or any other person
before or concurrently with the execution of such will or to such a trust to be
established in writing at a future date provided that any such future trust in-
strument or amendment thereto shall be signed by the settlor. Such device
or bequest shall not be invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable
or both or because the trust was amended after execution of the will. Unless
the will provides otherwise the property so devised or bequeathed shall not
be deemed held under a testamentary trust of the testator but shall become
and be a part of the principal of the trust to which it is given to be ad-
ministered and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the instrument
establishing such trust and any amendment thereof. An entire revocation of
the trust prior to the testator's death shall invalidate the devise or bequest unless
the will directs otherwise.
The legislature, apparently adopting without reservation the theory of
"independent legal significance," has settled the law in at least the following
respects:
(a) Pour-over provisions are valid even though the pour-over is made to
a revocable trust.
(b) If the power of alteration is reserved in the trust, the pour-over is
made to the trust as it exists at the time of the testator's death. The settlor
(whether it be the testator or a third person) may now control the ultimate
distribution of the property passing under the pour-over provisions through
alterations subsequent to the execution of the will.
(c) The trust may be created by a third party.
(d) The trust may be an unfunded life insurance trust even though the
settlor has reserved any or all the incidents of ownership in the insurance con-
tracts. This answers the questions raised by critics of similar statutes adopted
in other states, as to whether a trust consisting only of unassigned insurance
contracts has sufficient existence before the death of the insured.
(e) The property passing under the pour-over becomes an addition to the
inter vivos trust, and not a separate testamentary trust, unless the testator
1 2 Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 80 § 4 (1), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.4 (1947). The com-
ments to this new section point out that its passage was prompted 'by the discussion of the pour-
over question in the March, 1957 issue of the Pa. Fiduciary Review and by the paper presented by
the Hon. William S. Rahauser at the Judicial Conference held at Pittsburgh on January 29, 1957.
See also the report by the Hon. Hugh C. Boyle in 28 PA. BAR Ass'N. Q. 335, 343 (1957). It is
interesting to note that a Pennsylvania court has never had occasion to directly pass upon the
question of the validity of the pour-over provision when an amendment has been made subsequent
to the execution of the will.
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provides otherwise. Thus the statute gives full recognition to the trust as a
separate entity to which the property may be awarded at distribution without
the necessity of probating the trust instrument.
(f) A complete revocation of the trust prior to the testator's death will
invalidate the pour-over provision unless the will directs otherwise. Note
that by the qualification, unless the will directs otherwise, the section makes
allowance for the expressed intent of the testator, and apparently adopts, in
this respect, the theory of incorporation by reference in order to reach such
result.
(g) The pour-over may now be made to a trust to be established in writing
at a future date so long as such future trust instrument or amendment thereto
is signed by the settlors. This presumably will require the instrument to be
signed "at the end thereof," and in all other respects conform to the require-
ments of a signature to a will.
It should be noted in reference to the latter provisions that the Pennsyl-
vania Act has gone beyond, any reported appellate case or similar statute in
other jurisdictions.13 An even greater departure may be observed when this
provision is integrated into the provision which permits the trust to be one
created :by a third person. The net result of the combination is that the pour-
over may then be made to a trust created subsequent to the execution of the
will by a person other than the testator. To the advocate of strict adherence
to testamentary formality, this result may be somewhat shocking. However
the extension seems to be justified when one considers the Pennsylvania policy
of extreme liberality in the execution of wills-perhaps the most liberal in
the United States.1" Moreover, this result is entirely consistent with the theory
underlying the doctrine of "independent significance"; and in fact, carries the
theory to its logical conclusion. The will is merely interpreted by resorting to
extrinsic facts of independent significance, existing not at the time of the exe-
cution of the will, but at the time of the testator's death.
Viewing this new section as a whole, it would seem that the legislature
has squarely faced and conquered the difficulties that have confronted the
courts of other jurisdictions. Consideration has also apparently been given
to the manifest deficiences in similar statutes outside Pennsylvania. Of course,
one could indulge in predicting new judicial encounters which could possibly
arise under the present provision. For instance, suppose that the living trust
13 ILLINOIS: ILL. REV. STAT. c 3, § 194a (1955).
INDIANA: IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-601 (Supp. 1953).
N. CAROLINA: GEN. STAT. N. CAR. § 31-47. (Supp. 1955) c. 388.
WISCONSIN: WISC. STAT. § 231. 205 (1955).
None of these statutes have gone so far as the Pennsylvania Act in validating the pour-over
into a trust to be established in the future.
14 Pennsylvania is unique in that the only formality required for the valid execution of a will
is the signature at the end thereof.
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has no assets prior to the testator's death, or if assets are included, they are in-
significant in amount. Certainly in such a case the trust has no independent
significance. Perhaps for that reason the court would invalidate the pour-
over. But to proceed with such legal pessimism would serve no useful pur-
pose since such examples are few and can be easily avoided by simply follow-
ing the liberal provisions of the new section.
The legislative intent is unquestionable. It is to validate completely the
many variations of the pour-over provision, and thus supply the lawyer with
a new and useful means of safety meeting the needs and desires of his client.
Further, it is safe to assume that the courts will be able to find ample statutory
language to carry out such intent. As a small addition to this concerted effort,
the following are suggested as form clauses in providing for the pour-over:
(1) POUR-OVER FROM A WILL TO AN EXISTING TRUST.
ITEM .............. : I give, devise and bequeath all the residue of
my estate, of whatever nature and wherever situated to the ...............
....... Trust Company, trustee of the trust created by me (or by .........
........................ ) on the ...... day of .............. , 1958, for
the following uses and purposes:
(a) To add such residue of my estate to the property constituting said
trust so as to make such residue a part thereof.
(b) To have, hold, manage and dispose of the same in accordance with
the terms of said trust agreement, and any amendments or alterations
thereto.
Unless the trust agreement so provides, there may be a serious question
as to whether the trustee has the power to receive additional property into
the trust. This is particularly true when the addition is attempted to be made
by a person other than the settlor. An extended discussion of the ramifications
of this problem is, however, beyond the scope of this note. For present pur-
poses, it will suffice to point out that a provision giving the trustee power to
receive additional property is most desirable. The trust agreement might
contain the following such provision:
The settlor (and/or .............................. ) shall have and
possess the right and power to direct by his (their) will (s) the payment and de-
livery of his (their) net estate, or any part thereof, to this trust to be held in
accordance with the terms and conditions herein specified; provided, the trustee
shall not be required to receive additional property without his (its) consent,
if such receipt would involve additional duties, unless satisfactory arrangement





(2) POUR-OVER FROM A WILL TO A TRUST TO BE ESTIMATED
IN THE FUTURE.
In providing for a pour-over from the will to a trust to be established
subsequent to the execution of the will, caution should be observed so as to
comply exactly with the requirements of the statute. However, this may be
readily accomplished by executing the future trust instrument with the same
simple formalities as are required for Pennsylvania wills i.e. a proper signa-
ture at the end thereof. The provision in the will could be as follows:
ITEM ............................ : I give devise and bequeath all
the residue of my estate, of whatever nature and wherever situated to the trus-
tee of a trust that I ( ............................. ) may hereafter create
by written instrument signed by me (the settlor) at the end thereof, for the fol-
ing uses and purposes:
(a) To add such residue of my estate to the property constituting said
trust so as to make said residue a part thereof.
(b) To have, hold, manage and dispose of the same in accordance with
the terms of said trust agreement and any written amendments or
alterations thereto.
ITEM .............................. : In the event that no such
trust is created by me ( ............................ ) during my lifetime,
or should the bequest or devise to such trust be invalid for any reason what-
soever, I give, devise and bequeath all the residue of my estate, of whatever
nature and wherever situated, as follows: ..............................
(3) POUR-OVER FROM AN INTER VIVOS TRUST TO A TESTA-
MENTARY TRUST CREATED BY THE WILL.
In many estate plans it may be desirable and convenient to utilize the
pour-over provision in reverse, i.e. from an inter vivos or insurance trust into
a testamentary trust. Generally, the principles heretofore discussed are equally
applicable to this situation, and need not be repeated. In addition to the terms
of the inter vivos trust directing the distribution of the property to the trust
created ;by the testator, and the usual provisions for the establishment of a
testamentary trust, there should be a provision in the will authorizing the re-
ceipt of such a pour-over:
ITEM ................. ............. In the settlement of my
estate and during the continuance of the foregoing trust, my executor and the
trustee of such trust, shall possess among others, the following powers:
1. ........ ..................
2. To receive additional property from any inter vivos or insurance trust
created by me ( ............................... ) during my life-
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time, and to administer such property as a part of my trust estate in ac-
cordance with the terms 'hereinbefore specified. The trustee shall not be
required to receive such additional property without his consent if such
receipt would involve additional duties, unless satisfactory arrangement is
made for the compensation of the trustee for administering such additional
property.
Undoubtedly one of the most desirable features of the new provision is
that it specifically provides for the pour-over into, or from, a funded or un-
funded life insurance trust. For that reason, this survey of the law on the
pour-over provision in Pennsylvania would be incomplete without brief refer-
ence to the statutory counterpart of section 14.1 i.e. the new section 8 of the
Estates Act of 1947 which provides as follows: 11
Section 8. Designation of Insurance Beneficiaries Not Testamentary. The
designation of beneficiaries of life insurance shall not be considered testa-
mentary regardless of whether the insurance contract designates the ultimate
beneficiaries or makes the proceeds payable directly or indirectly to a trustee
of a trust under a will or under a separate trust instrument which designates
the ultimate beneficiaries and regardless of whether any such trust is amendable
or revocable or both or is funded or unfunded and notwithstanding a reserva-
tion to the settlor of all rights of ownership in the insurance contracts. Unless
otherwise expressly provided in the conveyance funds or other property so
passing to a trust under a will shall become and be a part of the testamentary
trust to be administered and disposed of in accordance with the provisions
thereof without forming any part of the testator's estate for administration by
his personal representative.
The primary purpose of the new section is to remove the problems and
legal uncertainties created by the decision in Brown's Estate6 which had held
that an unfunded life insurance trust was a testamentary disposition and as
such, subject to a surviving spouse's right of election. It is now clear that a
life insurance trust, whether it be funded or unfunded, shall not be considered
testamentary, notwithstanding the fact that the incidents of ownership are
retained by the insured. The result of this section is to open the door to
greater use of the insurance trust, and to the flexible and convenient combina-
tion of such a trust with a pour-over provision. It makes certain that the in-
surance funds are freed from administration expenses and from the claims of
the testator's creditors even though such proceeds may be payable to a testa-
mentary trustee. It is, however, still an open question whether the insurance
funds 'become subject to Pennsylvania inheritance taxes. This uncertainty
15 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20 § 301.7a.
16384 Pa. 99, 119 A.2d 513 (1956). Noted, Pa. Fiduciary Review, March, 1955, February,
1956; 1 VILLA. L. REv. 367 (1957). -
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stems from the Supreme Court decision in Meyer's Estate.7 There the court
ruled that where a deed of trust of life insurance policies names no beneficiaries
of the trust but provides that the principal shall be distributed in accordance
with the terms of the settlor's will, and reserves to the settlor the right to revoke
or alter the trust, the proceeds of such policies are subject to transfer inheri-
tance tax. The decision rested on the fact that the deed created no interest,
vested or contingent, in any named beneficiaries. Distribution of the principal
was wholly dependent upon the terms of the will which could not take effect
until death.
This decision was reaffirmed and carried one step further in the subse-
quent case of Kenin's Estate "g where the deed of trust provided that the trustee
of the insurance trust should collect the proceeds and distribute them to a
testamentary trustee named in the will, to be held by him in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the testamentary trust set forth in the will. The
settlor reserved the power to amend and revoke the insurance trust. On
these facts, the trust was held to be testamentary under the principles announced
in Meyer's Estate to the effect that only where the trust instrument is complete
in itself, by naming the beneficiaries of the policy, is the fund realized from
such policy free of tax. So long as post-mortem control over the proceeds of
the life insurance policy is exercised, such proceeds must be treated, for in-
heritance tax purposes, as though they were made payable to the settlor's
estate. 9
What effect, if any, the new statutory provision may have on these deci-
sions is quite uncertain. It is clear that the intent of the legislature is to remove
the taint of testamentary characterization from the act of designating insur-
ance beneficiaries regardless of the identity of such 'beneficiaries. It would
seem, therefore, that the conflict should :be resolved in favor of the taxpayer
but to rely on such an assumption is dangerous, particularly where a 15%c tax
is involved.20 For that reason, perhaps this should well be a matter of con-
sideration in the contemplated revision of the Pennsylvania inheritance tax
laws .1
Notwithstanding this area of doubt, the new section provides the estate
planner with the long recognized advantages of the insurance trust-flexibil-
ity, privacy, and ease of preserving the principal for the benefit of future gen-
17 309 Pa. 581, 164 At. 611 (1932). See also Schulman, The Personal Insurance Trust in
Pennsylvania, 12 TEMP. L. Q. 216 (1937).
18 343 Pa. 549, 23 A.2d 837 (1942).
39 Id. at 557, 23 A.2d at 843.
20 See Cooper, Testamentary Trust for Insurance, 97 TRUSTS AND ESTATES, 113 (1958.)
21 The Joint State Government Committee on Decedent's Estates Law has already commenced
work on the revision of the Pa. Inheritance tax laws.
[VOL. 62
erations. When coupled with a pour-over provision, these advantages are
retained, and added to them are the factors of even greater flexibility in the
overall estate plan and reduced administration expenses and costs of probate.
All this can now be achieved without the danger that the insurance trust may
be considered testamentary, and subject to the resultant undesirable conse-
quences inherent in a testamentary disposition.
Taken together the two new sections supply the foundation for countless
variations of the pour-over provision, tailored to the equally varied require-
ments of a sound estate plan. Where the testator dies domiciled in Pennsyl-
vania, such sections have made certain that which is most uncertain in other
jurisdictions. Unfortunately the security and protection stops at the state's
boundaries." Beyond them, the confusing state of affairs, pointed out earlier
in this note, continues in full force.
CARL F. BARGER.
22 Thus precaution must be taken on behalf of the testator who might acquire real estate in
a foreign jurisdiction, and thus be subjected to the foreign law insofar as it concerns the devolution
of such real estate. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws, § 245, 249 (1934). This may not be
true if there is a statute in such foreign jurisdiction embodying the provisions of the uniform Wills
Act. UNIFORM LAWS ANN., Vol. 9, page 343 (1957). The same danger is present when a person
relies upon the liberal provisions of the Pennsylvania Act, and then prior to his death changes his
legal residence, or where the very question of the state of his legal residence is in doubt. Con-
sequently, it is most advisable to review, republish and in some cases redraft the will, when for
example, amendments are made to the trust, or when the pour-over is to be made to a future trust,
and such trust is created.
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